October 26–November 1, 2024

• Driver who carries uninsured motorist insurance is injured in a car accident with an uninsured motorist.  Driver sues both the uninsured motorist and Driver’s Insurer, but the case proceeds to trial against Driver’s Insurer alone.  Afterward, the jury finds for the Driver and awards her $320,000.00 in damages for the uninsured motorist’s negligence.  Driver seeks an award of pre-judgment interest against her Insurer, which the trial court denies on the basis that pre-judgment interest is not available in personal injury actions.  Driver then appeals the denial of pre-judgment interest.  Tennessee Court of Appeals, in the week’s most important case: Although “[a] suit brought against an uninsured motorist carrier has been described as a ‘hybrid’ in the sense that it is a contract action that ‘also involve[s] tort law principles[,]’” it’s a contract claim.  So the Driver is entitled to pre-judgment interest of up to 10% per year from her Insurer, who declined to pay up voluntarily even though “[i]t was clear that the injuries sustained by [Driver] were caused by an uninsured motorist for which she had a policy of coverage up to $500,000.00.”
• After a property sale does not close in accordance with the contracting parties’ contract, the property is sold to a third party instead.  But the original buyer had assigned its rights by this point, and the original buyer’s assignee sues the third party buyer for civil conspiracy to commit a breach of contract, tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and statutory inducement of breach of contract.  The trial court ultimately dismisses all of these claims on summary judgment without addressing whether—after the property did not close as scheduled—the original contract was still enforceable.  After both wading through a jurisdictional thicket caused by a “mistake by the trial court on or around July 1, 2022 [that] inexplicably backdated [an order] to June 24, 2022” and noting the complex law that governs the case, will the Tennessee Court of Appeals reverse a judge that your summarist described in the August 9, 2024 edition of Intermediate Scrutiny as “one of Tennessee’s most-frequently-reversed trial court judges[, ] who had a reversal rate of over 50% at your summarist’s last count”?  Tennessee Court of Appeals:  Yep.  “[T]he trial court largely did not address [relevant facts included in the parties’ summary judgment briefing] in its order or consider their legal ramifications in any way.”  Further, “[g]iven that the enforceability of the Original Contract is inextricably linked to these issues, it is difficult to discern how the issues in this case can be resolved without also resolving this central question,” which the trial court neglected to do.  At any rate, “[b]ecause more than one inference can be drawn from the facts presented, summary judgment as to whether [the third party] had sufficient knowledge of the Original Contract for purposes of [assignee’s] claims was premature.”  Thus, the trial court’s summary judgment order is vacated, and the case is remanded for the trial court to make further errors for further proceedings.
• Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development seeks reimbursement for $3,500.00 for overpayment of unemployment benefits due to Man’s fraudulent misrepresentation that he did not earn wages during the relevant time period.  The administrative appeal process results in a judgment for the Department, which Man appeals to chancery court.  The chancery court affirms the judgment as supported by substantial and material evidence, so Man appeals again.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: “[Man’s] brief is deficient in a number of ways” that violate our rules, and his “argument section lacks a clear description of what he is appealing and why the appeal should be granted.”  So “he has waived his right to appeal any issue, and the appeal is dismissed.”
• Property Owner who previously has been cited and enjoined for violating Metro Nashville’s Short-Term Rental Property ordinance files offensive declaratory judgment action asserting (curiously) that the ordinance “violate[s] his right to assembly and right to privacy under the United States Constitution and the Tennessee Constitution.”  He loses and appeals.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: The trial court shouldn’t have reached the merits of his claims; his constitutional challenge to the ordinance is res judicata, because it could have been and should have been raised in preceding litigation where Property Owner was being cited for violating the ordinance.  Regardless, though, Metro’s STRP ordinance pretty clearly does not violate the right to assembly or the right to privacy, and it survives rational basis review.
• Tennessee Court of Appeals: “[T]he question here in our opinion boils down to the following: is it necessary to accord final judgment status to orders entered by the Juvenile Court in dependency and neglect proceedings wherein requests for transfer are denied as a result of determinations that the [Indian Child Welfare Act] does not apply?”  You may think that that question sounds boring!  But you should come for the lengthy discussion about whether Tennessee recognizes the collateral order doctrine (answer: it might!) and stay for the final ruling that applying the doctrine is not necessary here because Tennessee’s certiorari statute provides an available mechanism for obtaining interlocutory review of the order that the intervening Indian Tribe involved in the case contends will cause irreparable harm if not timely remedied.  Relatedly, given that all parties agree that something called “the Existing Indian Family Doctrine” is no longer good law, the Juvenile Court should really revisit the interlocutory order about which the Indian Tribe is righteously complaining.
• Pro se litigant appeals adverse jury verdict in breach of contract case, arguing that errors conducted in trial—including the trial court’s exclusion of key evidence—warrant a new trial.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: Alas, “[u]nder our appellate rules, issues based on the ‘admission or exclusion of evidence . . . or other action committed or occurring during the trial of the case, or other ground upon which a new trial is sought’ must first be presented to the trial court in a motion for a new trial.”  “And even if we view [Appellant’s] post-trial motion exceedingly generously, it lacks the necessary specificity to preserve the issues she has raised on appeal.”  So the issues are waived, and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
• Insurance Company files a declaratory judgment suit against Woman to establish that it has no coverage obligations in connection with a murder committed by Woman’s deceased husband.  Woman informs a Sheriff’s Deputy who tries to serve process to leave it with someone else, which the Deputy does.  Insurance Company later obtains a default judgment establishing that there is no coverage, which Woman unsuccessfully tries to unwind many months later after claiming that service was defective and that she wasn’t a proper party.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: The trial court found that Woman (who clearly lied about a bunch of stuff) was not credible, and we aren’t going to disturb that finding, so we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Woman authorized an agent to accept process.   The evidence also proved that Woman willfully took a default here, so she can’t move to set it aside under Rule 60.02.  And Woman’s remaining argument that she was not a proper party is both waived (because it wasn’t properly raised below) and unsupported.  So the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.