December 28, 2024–January 10, 2025

• After receiving an anonymous report of sexual assault that the anonymous reporter alleged was perpetrated by Pastor, the Southern Baptist Convention contacts Pastor’s employer both orally and in writing.  Orally, an employee of the Southern Baptist Convention suggests that an allegation about Pastor involving “contact with a minor” (which was not described) was credible, but she does not mention that the allegation was made anonymously.  In writing, the Southern Baptist Convention then mails a letter to Pastor’s employer which poses “a series of questions” about Pastor and states that Pastor’s employer “may employ an individual with an alleged history of abuse.”  The letter does not disclose that the report at issue was anonymous and singular.  Pastor then sues the Southern Baptist Convention for defamation, defamation by implication, and false light, and the Southern Baptist Convention responds by petitioning the trial court to dismiss Pastor’s claims under the Tennessee Public Participation Act.  The trial court denies the petition, ruling that the TPPA does not apply.  Afterward, the Southern Baptist Convention files an interlocutory appeal as of right that concerns (for some reason) only the written statements.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: The TPPA applies here; sexual assault of a minor “is clearly an issue related to ‘health or safety’” (which is one of the TPPA’s expressly enumerated categories of public concern), so that ruling was error.  But even if the Southern Baptist Convention’s statements were literally true, there is sufficient implied defamatory meaning for Pastor’s defamation claim to survive, and the false light claim survives for basically the same reason.  [Editorial note: Though due to apparent briefing deficiencies—a host of arguments were deemed waived either as undeveloped or untimely presented—the opinion has some issues.  Most prominently: there is a “widely adopted defamation principle that questions are questions” and thus cannot be defamatory.  The opinion also states, incorrectly, that “[t]here is no meaningful difference between [the TPPA’s] standard and the Rule 12 standard, which requires the trial court to treat the allegations in the complaint as true,” though the correct analogue is to Rule 56, because the TPPA is an evidentiary motion with burdens that can only be met using admissible evidence, and unverified allegations in a complaint are not admissible evidence.]
• Business dispute between two brothers devolves into litigation.  After trial, the trial court rules in favor of the suing brother, holding that an express oral agreement existed between the brothers that provided for equal compensation.  The losing brother appeals.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: The suing brother literally testified that the purported oral agreement was “unspoken.” Thus, the trial court’s ruling “is puzzling, since an express oral agreement entails some measure of communication.”  And pretty much nothing else the trial court ruled was correct, either.  So we reverse everything.
• Mother and Stepfather seek (and obtain) termination of Father’s parental rights based on Father’s alleged abandonment by willful failure to visit.  Father appeals.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: The trial court’s order lacks sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its ruling.  Most prominently, Mother and Father provided conflicting testimony on a critical issue (how often Father visited their child during the relevant time period), and the trial court failed to make credibility determinations to resolve that conflict.  Thus, the trial court’s ruling is vacated with instructions to make necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law.
• Plaintiff takes his car to a body shop to be repaired.  Following a payment dispute, the owner of the body shop somehow obtains title to the car and sells it to CarMax.  Plaintiff then sues both the owner of the body shop and CarMax.  CarMax prevails on summary judgment based on its argument that it was a good-faith purchaser for value, and the judgment is certified as final.  Afterward, Plaintiff appeals.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: Reversed.  The owner of the body shop was a bailee of Plaintiff’s car, not its purchaser.  And a “bailee cannot pass title to [a] good faith purchaser for value.”  Further, while a bailee can acquire valid title as a statutory “purchaser” through a garage-keeper’s lien (likely what happened here), the undisputed record facts do not establish whether this is the route by which the owner of the body shop obtained title to the car, which is necessary for CarMax to obtain summary judgment.  Nor does the record support a determination that the owner of the body shop is a “merchant who deals in goods of” the kind sold, so a separate Uniform Commercial Code provision governing “entrustment” does not enable CarMax to prevail on summary judgment, either.  Thus, we reverse.
• Pro se litigant who is the subject of an order of protection and was held in criminal contempt seeks accelerated interlocutory appeal of the denial of her motions to recuse the trial judge due to alleged bias.  Impressively, pro se litigant appears to have complied with all necessary procedural requirements associated with her accelerated interlocutory appeal and—unlike nearly all pro se litigants (like this one) and many attorneys—avoids a procedural dismissal.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: She loses on the merits, though, given that there is no evidence of bias.  And her complaints that the trial court failed to rule on certain motions after she filed her notices of appeal are especially groundless, given that her appeals transferred jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals and necessarily precluded the trial court from ruling on anything other than ancillary matters (like enforcement or collection) without a remand order, which she didn’t seek.  So we affirm the trial court’s denial of the recusal motions.
• Buyers of property “as is” discover a sinkhole on the property months after the sale.  Buyers then sue Sellers, who insist that they had no knowledge of any sinkhole on the property (which they accordingly did not disclose).  After a bench trial, the trial court finds Sellers liable for negligence, and Sellers appeal.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: Sellers’ testimony that they didn’t know about the sinkhole—and repeatedly drove over the area with their 500-pound lawnmower during the seven months preceding the sale—was “not only credible, but unchallenged.”  Thus, Sellers could not have breached a duty of care by failing to disclose the sinkhole, since that duty applies only to material defects that were or should have been apparent at the time of sale.  Because Buyers contractually agreed to purchase the property on an “as is” basis, Sellers also cannot be held liable on a failure to disclose theory (and the trial court’s rulings on the matter are “irreconcilable”).  Instead, a seller’s liability for the failure to disclose material facts in a real estate transaction is coextensive with a party’s liability for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation, which Buyers can’t establish here.  Moreover, “[t]here is no competent evidence to support a finding that anything Sellers did or failed to do damaged or devalued the Property.”  So the Davidson County Chancellor got this badly wrong, and its judgment is reversed.  Sellers also are entitled to recover all of their attorney’s fees, both in the trial court and on appeal.
• Before he dies, Decedent executes a quitclaim deed conveying property to his Daughter (who also was his attorney-in-fact) for $1.00.  Afterward, Decedent dies, and Daughter records the deed following his death.  Decedent’s estate then sues Daughter, alleging not only that Decedent lacked sufficient mental capacity to make the transfer, but also “that Daughter and Decedent were in a confidential relationship and that Daughter exerted undue influence over her father in order to obtain the quit claim deed to the Property.”  After a bench trial, the trial court sets aside the deed and orders the property made part of Decedent’s probate estate, finding: (1) suspicious circumstances supporting undue influence, (2) that Daughter was in a confidential relationship with the Decedent by virtue of her role as his attorney-in-fact, and (3) that the transaction at issue benefitted Daughter.  Daughter, proceeding pro se, appeals.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: Based in part on the fact that the record (which lacks a transcript) is insufficient to enable appellate review, we find no error in any determination made below and affirm.

Firm Updates

Congratulations to Horwitz Law, PLLC client Daylan Langford! The deadline to appeal having expired, the American hero who protested a no-good, very-bad mechanic by picketing his business in a chicken suit (and was subjected to a retaliatory SLAPP-suit in response) has officially booked his win for good.  All that’s left to do is determine how much money the mechanic has to pay for the privilege.

And congratulations to Horwitz Law, PLLC clients Rachel Welty and Aftyn Behn!  After the Attorney General’s Office sought to put important First Amendment litigation that is not going well for them on hold, the District Court (Sixth Circuit Judge Gibbons presiding by designation) has flatly said no.  So the case moves forward efficiently, and a final judgment could enter as soon as this month.