February 10–February 16, 2024

• Bank 1 sues Bank 2 regarding an “approximately $100 million” loss related to its purchase of collateralized debt obligations—better known as “the toxic assets that catalyzed the Great Recession.”  Tennessee Court of Appeals: Because reasonable diligence would have put Bank 1 on notice of its claims before September 15, 2008—and because Bank 1 didn’t file its lawsuit until September 15, 2011—the applicable statutes of limitations mean that Bank 1’s claims are worth about as much as the toxic assets it bought.
• “Short-lived” marriage (four months) produces long divorce litigation (2.5 years).  Cheating Ex-Husband: I should get the Toyota 4-Runner I bought before we got married, at least.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: “Husband used marital funds to pay for the monthly debt obligation on the vehicle,” and “it was his intent that the 4-Runner be used as the parties’ family vehicle,” so “the vehicle was transmuted into marital property through Husband’s actions and stated intent.”  It was also equitable to award Ex-Wife the car, so she gets it.  Ex-Husband gets half the debt on the car, though, and—in this rare case where a litigant preserved the issue properly—he gets to pay Ex-Wife’s appellate attorney’s fees, too.
• Out-of-jurisdiction lawyer who apparently failed to disclose “a number of sanctions that had been imposed on [him] by other jurisdictions, including a suspension from the practice of law” in his motion to appear pro hac vice files some bogus election-related litigation in Tennessee.  The trial court orally states that it will deny the lawyer’s PHV motion.  Before the order is entered, though, the lawyer’s client nonsuits.  The trial court then issues a written order denying the PHV motion and a written nonsuit order dismissing the case without prejudice, and the out-of-jurisdiction lawyer appeals the PHV denial.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: Although this case is pretty obviously moot, we issue a nine-page ruling adjudicating some vitally important matters—including a matter related to post-nonsuit subject matter jurisdiction that relies on contested recusal-related authority and conflicts directly with a decision we just issued last month—without ever mentioning mootness for some reason.  We also designate our decision here non-citable, though.
• Appellant who has had physical custody of Child petitions to terminate Parents’ parental rights.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: Although the trial court’s judgment isn’t final, we use Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 to waive the finality requirement for the second time in three weeks and adjudicate this appeal, which concerns Mother alone.  We also find that: (1) “Mother presented sufficient evidence that her failure to visit during this time period was not willful,” (2) Mother’s failure to raise willfulness as a defense to failure to support means that “we affirm the trial court’s finding that this ground supported termination of Mother’s parental rights[,]” and (3) “the ground of persistent conditions is inapplicable to this case.”  And although one statutory ground for terminating Mother’s parental rights has been proven, because “serious doubt exists as to Appellant’s argument that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest,” we affirm the trial court’s decision to dismiss the termination petition.
• After 38 pages, parents of children who were exposed to drugs and suffered severe child abuse have their parental rights terminated based on multiple statutory grounds and because the best interests of the children support termination, though.

Firm Lowlights

Back in 2021, Horwitz Law, PLLC client Jeffrey Hughes won a landmark victory against the Tennessee Board of Parole—one of the most incompetent and unfeeling cogs in Tennessee’s sprawling prison bureaucracy (order here).  And although the ruling meant that Mr. Hughes was released from prison about eight months before the Board of Parole planned to release him, the BOP nonetheless kept Mr. Hughes in prison for three months longer than the law allowed.  According to a Sixth Circuit panel, though, parole board members are absolutely immune from civil damages liability when they illicitly incarcerate you without giving you a legally-mandated hearing, since illegal conduct of that sort is judge-like.  Three boos for the overuse of judicial immunity and eliminating any hope of accountability for governmental law-breaking.