August 24–September 13, 2024

• Little Richard dies.  His will lays out a plan for nine beneficiaries to work together to exploit his rights of publicity upon his death.  After a majority of the beneficiaries agree on a plan to do so, a dissenting beneficiary—who is also one of the co-administrators of Little Richard’s estate—sabotages the plan.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: Under these circumstances, the trial court correctly held that the saboteur forfeited his rights as a beneficiary; breached a fiduciary duty to the Estate’s beneficiaries that warranted removing him as a co-administrator; and justified an award of attorney’s fees, including on appeal.
• Memphis firefighter posts extremely disgusting meme on Facebook, jokes about having unprotected sex with Girl Scouts.  Afterward, he’s terminated, and his termination is upheld through an administrative appeal to the Commissioner.  A Shelby County (of course) trial court then reverses the termination on equal protection (?) grounds despite that not making sense and on the basis that the decision was arbitrary and capricious.  Tennessee Court of Appeals, in decision that is susceptible to summary reversal given that it pretty arguably strays from the highly restrictive standard of review that governs here: A bunch of other firefighters posted racist, disparaging, and other inappropriate stuff that embarrassed the department, but they weren’t terminated.  And Memphis policy says that discipline must be fair and consistent, but no consistency findings were made below.  So we vacate everything that happened below and remand to the Commissioner for reconsideration of all relevant circumstances.
• In a pair of orders that are bereft of any reasoning whatsoever, Shelby County (who else?) trial court denies motions in probate litigation and then dismisses a litigant’s amended pleading sua sponte.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: “At a minimum,” court orders must include an explanation for why the court has ordered something, and these don’t.  So we vacate the orders and remand to the trial court to do at least the bare minimum job of judging.
• A sale of real property falls through, leading the involved parties to sue one another.  After one party engages in extensive discovery abuse—including failing to appear for a deposition, refusing to produce important records, and providing nonsensical explanations for its misbehavior—the trial court enters a default judgment against it for discovery misconduct.  Afterward, the trial court denies the sanctioned litigant’s motion for new trial.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: No error here.  The sanction was a reasonable exercise of discretion given the litigant’s extensive discovery abuse.  And you can’t claim that the trial court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing that you never asked for.
• Alleged (though fiercely disputed) racial profiling incident at Maryville College (a private entity) causes public controversy, leads to termination of Maryville’s chief of security.  Fired security chief later sues the complainant and a local newspaper for defamation, which prompts the Defendants to file Tennessee Public Participation Act petitions.  Tennessee Court of Appeals, seemingly due to very bad briefing: This does not qualify as a matter of public concern based on the criteria alleged, so the TPPA doesn’t apply here.  And though it’s unclear why we reach the issues since it’s unnecessary to the appeal, the fair report privilege doesn’t apply here, either, because it’s limited to governmental proceedings or actions.  [Editorial note: This case would have—or at least, it should have—come out differently if the Defendants had argued that their speech concerned an issue related either to “safety” or “community well-being.”]
• Pro se appellant seeks appeal as of right from an interlocutory trial court order.  Tennessee’s Court of Appeals: Given the scope of our appellate jurisdiction—which requires a final order—no soup for you.  Appeal dismissed.
• Shopper slips on spilt milk and falls at Dollar General, files premises liability claim.  Trial Court: Summary judgment for Dollar General because Shopper didn’t provide any evidence about how long the spill existed.  Tennessee Court of Appeals (with pictures!):  Reversed.  Among other things, Shopper presented evidence that a Dollar General employee knew of the spill and could have removed or warned of the dangerous condition sufficiently before Shopper slipped, which is enough to send this case to a jury.
• Elderly woman makes plans with a lawyer to formalize her last will and testament, handwrites notes about how she wants her assets distributed upon her death.  Sadly, she gets sick and dies before executing her will, resulting in litigation between the people who stood to benefit from her handwritten intentions and those who would benefit from the decedent dying intestate.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: Based on the detailed facts and credibility determinations made below, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that the decedent’s handwritten document satisfied the requirements of a holographic will and that the plaintiff overcame the presumption of revocation for a lost will.
• Pro se litigant who is upset about the State’s denial of unemployment benefits initiates serial litigation over several years.  One tentacle of that litigation ends up in the Claims Commission, which dismisses it on statute of limitations and sovereign immunity grounds.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: And that decision is affirmed, because the “litany of grievances” recounted in the pro se litigant’s briefing are not a substitute for a legal argument, which is absent.  So all of litigant’s appellate claims are waived.
• County employee notices erosion on a road, so the employee lays something called “riprap” stone.  After heavy rain, a man driving down the road encounters a “washout” in the area that obstructs the road damage, and he falls into a sinkhole.  The man then sues the county for negligence under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, but the trial court dismisses the case on summary judgment. Tennessee Court of Appeals: Reversed.  Discretionary function immunity doesn’t apply to the man’s claims.  Neither does the public duty doctrine, both because there is a specific statutory waiver of immunity for dangerous road conditions and applying the public duty doctrine to such claims would make that waiver meaningless [editorial note: that’s also true of all other negligence claims for which the GTLA waives immunity, since the public duty doctrine is not part of the GTLA and the Tennessee Supreme Court made up its application to GTLA claims).  And because apportioning fault is generally considered a question of fact, the trial court shouldn’t have held at the summary judgment stage that the man was more than 50% at fault.
• Property owner seeks to prevent the City of Chattanooga from demolishing his condemned house.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: But since he sold the house while his appeal was pending, he has no further interest in the house and has lost his standing to seek relief regarding it.  Thus, this appeal is dismissed for lack of standing, given that standing must be maintained throughout the life of a case.
• Litigants fighting over a land sale agree to settle their dispute by turning it over to a Tennessee licensed appraiser, agree to be bound by the appraiser’s valuation.  Afterward, a party that doesn’t like the valuation challenges it.  Tennessee Court of Appeals (editorial note: incorrectly, I think): Settlement agreements must be construed according to both their text and the surrounding circumstances, and we think that an appraisal consistent with the professional standard of care was an implied settlement term.  Thus, the appraisal can be challenged on the limited basis that it contravened the professional standard of care.
• During worker’s compensation case, Plaintiff’s counsel receives information that Plaintiff’s spinal surgery was performed at the wrong level.  Plaintiff’s counsel then reviews the information a couple of weeks later and informs the Plaintiff a week or so after that.  Within one year of being informed—but more than one year after Plaintiff’s worker’s compensation attorney received the documents—the Plaintiff initiates a Health Care Liability Act (medical malpractice) lawsuit.  Thus, whether the lawsuit is time-barred by the relevant statute of limitations turns on whether the Plaintiff can be charged with constructive notice based on her worker’s compensation attorney’s receipt of the relevant records.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: The Plaintiff cannot be charged with constructive notice, because the information was not material to the worker’s compensation case, and agency principles preclude imputing knowledge to the Plaintiff under these circumstances.  So the discovery rule applies here and makes the Plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim timely.
• Three-to-four-figure dispute over a tenant’s water bill spirals into extensive and costly litigation.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: There was no meeting of the minds as to how the tenant’s water bill would be calculated, so there was no breach of contract.  The tenant has to pay quantum meruit damages for its water use, though, which we peg at $15 per month.  But the orders-of-magnitude-larger-than-that attorney’s fees award is vacated and must be reconsidered.
• Pro se plaintiff challenges denial of unemployment benefits by filing a civil warrant in General Sessions court four years after the denial.  Following dismissal and de novo appeal to circuit court, the circuit court dismisses the suit on all the grounds, and the pro se plaintiff appeals further.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: For all the reasons—insufficiency of service of process, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and more—the trial court’s dismissal is affirmed.
• In 2013, parties enter into consent decree concerning a property.  Roughly ten years later, one party seeks and obtains an extension of the decree.  A new owner later buys the property from one of the parties, and an earlier party (acting pro se) moves the trial court to join the new owner as a party to the long-ago-settled lawsuit.  Trial court: The new owner is not a party capable of being joined to the ten-year-old action.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: And the pro se litigant’s appeal of that order is frivolous, so he can pay the new owner’s attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.
• Pro se appellant files accelerated interlocutory appeal of trial court’s denial of motion to recuse.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: No problem with the trial court adjudicating the motion promptly without holding a hearing, given that the rules require prompt action.  And the motion was deficient and baseless anyway.
• Following five-day jury trial, Plaintiff wins $15,000.00 Tennessee Disability Act jury verdict against the State of Tennessee.  The Plaintiff’s lawyer then seeks $700,000 in attorney’s fees, which the trial court cuts to just over $500,000.  Tennessee Court of Appeals: Tennessee has ten factors for determining the reasonableness of a fee award, and we want trial courts to make findings that address all ten factors, which didn’t happen here.  So we vacate the award and remand for new findings.  [Editorial note: A footnote in this decision conflicts with federal law on an important issue related to whether respondents have any rebuttal burden in response to a well-supported fee petition.  Tennessee’s fee-shifting law is also extremely ill-conceived, and it both assures and incentivizes extensive satellite litigation over fee claims like this.]