


| 1 | FAYETTEVILLE, TENNESSEE ------ DECEMBER 13, 2023 |
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| 3 | THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR LINCOLN COUNTY |
| 4 | HON. M. WYATT BURK, PRESIDING |
| 5 | OOO |
| 6 |  |
| 7 | (The motion hearing in Small, |
| 8 | Allen \& Martinez versus Law \& Osgood |
| 9 | was convened at approximately 9:31 |
| 10 | a.m.) |
| 11 |  |
| 12 | THE COURT: All right. This is |
| 13 | Dorothy Small, Tonya Allen, and Roger |
| 14 | Martinez versus Jon Law and Tina |
| 15 | Towry Osgood. This is on for a |
| 16 | petition to dismiss filed by the |
| 17 | Defendants in this matter by |
| 18 | Mr. Horwitz. |
| 19 | I will hear you. |
| 20 | MR. HORWITZ: Good morning, Your |
| 21 | Honor. |
| 22 | THE COURT: Good morning. |
| 23 | MR. HORWITZ: Daniel Horwitz of |
| 24 | the Nashville bar on behalf of the |
| 25 | Defendants. I'm here with co-counsel |

Melissa Dix and Lindsey Smith. Also have our clients sitting in the room. THE COURT: Good to see you guys.

MR. HORWITZ: Your Honor, this is a Tennessee Public Participation Act petition to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claim. There is a single invasion of privacy claim alleged here.

I want to walk through the Tennessee Public Participation Act, because as Your Honor knows, it's a little bit unusual. It's not your typical motion to dismiss, it's not your typical motion for summary judgment. It is a dispositive petition and we are seeking dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice here.

Under the Tennessee Public Participation Act, there is a three-step inquiry. So today I am going to ask Your Honor to make at least two rulings, up to three, but the first thing that I need to prove is that this is a lawsuit, it's a
claim that was filed in relation to or in response to the exercise of the right of free speech as defined by statute or the right to petition. We have asserted that. We have supported that claim with evidence.

This is involving citizen
advocates in a public petitioning campaign regarding local government, regarding tax policy, regarding maintenance of public parks. So we have asserted with abundant and uncontested evidence that this is a tort claim regarding which the T.P.P.A. applies. And from my reading of opposing counsel's response, that is not contested.

So that is step one of this inquiry. We have to demonstrate a prima facie case that this is in relation to and in response to the exercise of the right of free speech or the right to petition.

We believe we have done so. We believe that there is no contest of
that fact. So that's the first ruling that $I$ am going to ask this Court to make, that we have met our initial burden under the Tennessee Public Participation Act.

Step two. This is where the burden shifts to the Plaintiffs. So once we have done what we needed to in step one, they have to come forward with admissible evidence and demonstrate a prima facie case for each essential element of their claims here. And there are two elements involved. So the first involves whether the matter disclosed is highly offensive to a reasonable person. And the second is whether the matter disclosed is not of legitimate concern to the public. It's our position they cannot meet either element. We only have to win on one of those in order to prevail here today, but $I$ do want to walk through this. So here is essentially the facts of this case.

Citizen advocates concerned about local policy expressed their concerns about local government, about failures in local government on Facebook. As a part of that advocacy, as part of an effort to promote a petitioning campaign to elected officials, they published the cell phone numbers of the elected officials for the purpose of having other citizens contact them to redress the grievances that they have about local policy.

They have now been sued for a whopping $\$ 750,000$ in asserted compensatory damages for simply publishing the cell phone numbers of their elected officials. And the claim that the Plaintiffs are attempting to make here, which they have not substantiated with any evidence, but purely the legal argument that lacks any citation, is that publishing a cell phone number of an elected official is highly
offensive to a reasonable person.
Your Honor, that cannot possibly be true. It doesn't make any sense. The whole point of having a cell phone is that people can contact you on it.

And so to address that argument, they say rather than the objective inquiry, right, the reasonable person inquiry that the law requires, this should simply be a subjective standard. It should simply be up to the person who has the cell phone, whether or not publishing that number is highly offensive.

Now that is not law, but even if it were, in this absolutely
extraordinary case, two of the three Plaintiffs published their own cell phone numbers on their nominating petition, on the candidate nominating petitions that are on file with the election commission. One of them initially published his own cell phone number online while trying to
sell a Honda CRV. It is clear beyond any conceivable dispute that these Plaintiffs did not consider the publication of their cell phone numbers to be highly offensive even themselves subjectively. We think that's the end of this case. They lose right there.

But turning to step two, it's arguably even easier, you know, whether the matter disclosed is not of legitimate concern to the public, and of course it is when we are talking about elected officials. There are a host of ways that disclosing an elected official's cell phone number would be a matter of public concern. The first is it simply allows constituents to meaningfully exercise the right to petition, which was the actual purpose for which their cell phone numbers were published. It's to allow citizens to contact these elected officials regarding matters
of public concern, local government tax policy, and maintenance of public parks, and redress the grievances that my clients had. So that's the end of the matter, but that's, of course, not the only reason why having an elected official's cell phone number would be a matter of public concern.

The second one is that an elected official's cell phone number is necessary to promote transparency and public records access, particularly when they are using their cell phones to conduct public business. And the uncontested evidence in this record from the Mayor is that they were using their cell --

THE COURT: The city mayor, right?

MR. HORWITZ: Yes, from the city mayor.
-- is that they were using their cell phones to conduct official business. So that's yet another
reason why this is, in fact, a matter of pubic concern.

Additionally, an elected official's cell phone number, like any other contact information, can provide abundant, useful information about their residency and their connections to the community that they serve.

Now we have noted here that one of the Plaintiffs has an Alabama area code, despite serving a Tennessee community. He has got a response to that. That's perfectly fine. It doesn't take it outside the ambit of a matter of public concern though. So simply having that contact information matters.

Fourth, Tennessee statutory law under the Tennessee Public Participation Act defines issues of public concern. Right? And among the defined issues are the government.

THE COURT: Counsel, wait just a
second. If you will shut that door, Officer.

I'm sorry. You may proceed.
MR. HORWITZ: Tennessee statutory law defines any issue related to the government, a public official, or a public figure as a matter of public concern, as a matter of statutory law. In order to harmonize this tort claim and invasion of privacy claim with this statutory definition, we think that should be construed the same way.

So for those reasons, we don't believe that they have met -established a prima facie case in element number one, we don't believe that they have established a prima facie case in element number two. Also, just know perhaps more simply, they didn't file any evidence in response to our petition. They filed an eight page response that was just full of argument, no citation to statutes, no citation to case law,
and no evidence appended to it.
Under Nandigam Neurology versus, Beavers, which happens to be our case, that is supposed to be a mandatory loss. Right? Because you have to file your evidence five days before hearing, and if you don't do it and you don't meet your evidentiary burden on the statute, you lose.

Now we are not necessarily asking this Court to rule on that ground. We think it's -- even if the evidence is considered, even if the claims are taken as true, they still simply cannot meet either element of their tort claim here.

To recap that, the ruling in step one that we want is that we met our own prima facie burden of demonstrating that the T.P.P.A. applies.

The second ruling we want this Court to make is that they did not meet their burden of proving each
essential element of their claims, and that should be it. But I will note, the T.P.P.A. has a third step as well. So even if they win at step two, and they don't, but even if they did, the third inquiry is whether or not the Defendants have established valid defenses here.

And we have. We have demonstrated, admittedly not through a binding Tennessee case, but with abundant, persuasive authority from across the United States that publishing contact information is protected speech within the First Amendment jurisprudence. There are a host of cases that have dealt with similar, not quite identical, but similar issues about posting contact information, some involving posting much more private contact information than we have here, Social Security numbers, for instance. And in every single one of those cases, uniformly, courts have said the First Amendment
protects this publication, especially when we are dealing with public officials or matters of public concern or matters of advocacy.

Your Honor, I just want to bring this back. We are talking about core political speech here. We are talking about citizens who --

THE COURT: It was tax policy, right?

MR. HORWITZ: Tax policy --
THE COURT: Tax policy and the cleanliness of the parks?

MR. HORWITZ: Of a public park, right.

Quintessential First Amendment advocacy. Quintessential exercise of the right to petition here. This is about the highest protection that the First Amendment affords to speech.

And under those circumstances, at minimum, it is the Plaintiffs' burden to demonstrate how and why this
speech can be restricted
constitutionally, and they simply
have not done so. We have marshaled a great deal of First Amendment authority holding that this is protected speech. They have mustered nothing saying that it is not. So we would win at step three as well. We have demonstrated a valid defense here that the First Amendment protects my clients' speech so we should win there as well.

I will note a couple of other arguments. There's a separate anti-SLAPP statute in play, the Tennessee Anti-SLAPP Act of 1997. It provides statutory immunity under these circumstances for truthful speech. All of the speech here is uncontestedly truthful. And secondly, as to Ms. Sanders, who is named Ms. Osgood in this complaint, she recopied the exact same thing that her codefendant -THE COURT: Hers was a republication of the same post of Mr. Law.

MR. HORWITZ: Just a republication in the same forum.

So by the time she published it, it was already out there. It wasn't private at all.

For all of these reasons, Your Honor, we think there are multiple bases for granting this petition. We think the petition should be granted. That will come with not only a dismissal but dismissal with prejudice. It will trigger a mandatory fee award, which we would like to bring to this Court's attention at a later date.

Also note that there is a sanctions provision under this statute. And I will just tell this Court there is no Tennessee Court of Appeals authority, Tennessee Supreme Court authority on how to determine sanctions. It's a relatively new area of law. We would like to brief that. We got a decision last week out of Davidson County that we think
applies the correct analysis, and we would like to bring that to the Court's attention to brief the sanctions portion of this at a later date when we file our fee petition, but for today, what I would like the Court to do is rule that we have established our burden at the first step of the T.P.P.A., that they have not established a prima facie case for each essential element of their tort claims in response, and if this Court deems it necessary, that we have established valid defenses to liability here.

For those reasons, we would ask the petition be granted and that the Plaintiffs' complaint be dismissed with prejudice.

THE COURT: Thank you. Appreciate it.

All right, Mr. Elliott. Good morning.

MR. ELLIOTT: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. How are you doing?

THE COURT: Doing well. Good to see you.

MR. ELLIOTT: Good to see you, Your Honor.

Steve Elliott, Nashville bar, here on behalf of the Plaintiffs in this matter.

Your Honor, the Defendants' petition, Motion to Dismiss, should be denied flat out.

Your Honor, this is not a strategic lawsuit as the Defendants claim that it is. The Plaintiffs simply want the Defendants to stop violating and invading their privacy, not the other way around. This lawsuit was not an attempt by the Plaintiffs to silence the Defendants' opposition to anything. To the contrary, the Plaintiffs welcome such debate in whatever form that can be done in, but there are less invasive and less harassing methods in which to do it.

For the Defendants to contact the

City aldermen in other methods, including for all to see on the City's website where phone numbers and e-mail addresses are posted for each and every alderman to be contacted about City business, that's the way these Plaintiffs wanted to be contacted, the way they published it on the City website, through e-mails and phone numbers.

Your Honor, it needs to be established on the front end that Ms. Dorothy Small, there is no allegation by Defendants in this case that she has published her own cell phone number at any time.

THE COURT: It was two of the three.

MR. ELLIOTT: It was two of the three. And I will get into whether or not that was public by the other two later but there is no allegation in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to her, so anything as to her should automatically be denied. She didn't
publish her cell phone number at all.
Your Honor, again, these cell
phone numbers are not of legitimate concerns to the public. There is no case law cited by the Defendants in support of that position. They have a really pretty brief that has Law Review articles cited and district court cases from Washington and Florida and other places cited, but there is not a single case from this state cited in support of Defendants' position today.

THE COURT: I don't think one exists, does it?

MR. ELLIOTT: Not one exists as far as I'm aware. So, I mean, this is totally new ground, plowing new earth here, as far as we can tell, Your Honor.

And regarding a legitimate concern, there's no justifiable reason for posting their cell phone numbers. Why in the world didn't Mr. Law simply post, hey, you all
need to get in touch with your city aldermen, your board of aldermen members, and here's the court -here's the City's website, a link to this, in order to get in contact with them? Why didn't Mr. Law simply copy and paste those numbers and those e-mail addresses listed on the City's website?

He did it for one reason only. He did it to harass and attempt to intimidate these Board of Aldermen by posting their personal cell phones, which were, we would submit, the only way to surmise how he obtained their cell phone numbers is through the Mayor. That's the only way, Your Honor.

Your Honor, in their petition to dismiss, the Defendants, they say it's strangely ridiculous. And then they also refer to the Plaintiffs' petition as curious. That's it. That it's a curious complaint. That it's strange. That it's unusual.

That's not enough just to dismiss it, especially not on what's essentially a Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss, Your Honor.

Again, Your Honor, I would just submit, as you look at the Defendants' brief, it is replete with editorial commentary, with the way they think things should be, with the way they think the law should be, without any authority whatsoever. I would state and refer this court to page 14 of their memorandum where Defendants state, quote: "As a matter of law, publishing someone else's cell phone is not highly offensive to any reasonable person," end quote. That's it. No citation, no foundation, no basis, no nothing. It's just what they say.

That's not good enough, Your Honor. Just because they want you to believe something is true doesn't mean that it is, especially not on a Rule 12 standard.

Your Honor, regarding these nominating petitions of Ms. Allen and Mr. Martinez, I don't know where they obtained those. They say they got them from the election commission. I can't find them online. I tried. I don't know if they were even published or public to begin with. If they are on file with the election commission, Plaintiffs would submit that that's not really public. They are on file with the election commission. They haven't publicized those numbers.

Mr. Martinez may have publicized a number to sell a CRV but he certainly didn't publicize his cell phone number to contact me about tax policy or cleaning up a city park. He wanted to be contacted the way the City's website said he should be contacted, which is the phone number and the e-mail address listed on the City's website, not through his personal business.

And to call him out for having a 256 area code, Your Honor, I am from Nashville and even I know how close Huntsville is to here. I have been here on matters before this Court and gone down to Huntsville to eat after I was done.

THE COURT: I am not worried about that. I think it's --

MR. ELLIOTT: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- just a side argument.

MR. ELLIOTT: Again, page 16 of their memorandum of law, they state that Plaintiffs' claims are transparently ridiculous. Your Honor, that's the same as saying they are curious. That's just their take. That's just their opinion. Everybody has got an opinion. That's not good enough for a Motion to Dismiss.

Your Honor, let me just remind the Court again of what's essentially -- I mean, this is a Rule 12 motion.

There's a really high bar here. You essentially have to take everything that the Plaintiffs' state is true. You test only the legal sufficiency of the complaint and not the strength of the proof at this stage. That's the Highlands versus Memphis case.

Your Honor, the Dobbs versus Guenther case says the motion cannot be sustained unless there appears there are no facts warranting relief.

Taking the complaint as true, we have established facts for relief. Actually, if you think about it, the Defendants have admitted that we have facts substantiating relief in this case. They have admitted, they have flaunted, they have thrown it out there for all to see that they have let everybody know and they do not deny that they published these cell phone numbers. So they admit, in essence, that we have established, at least factually for a Motion to Dismiss, that we have made a case,
that we've made one.
Your Honor, we would just submit, based on what we know now, based on the standards for a Motion to Dismiss, that this petition should be denied.

Thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Horwitz, you get the final say.

MR. HORWITZ: Thank you, Your Honor.

I guess I need to clarify a misapprehension at the outset, this is not a Rule 12 motion. It's not even something resembling a Rule 12 motion. This is a Tennessee Public Participation Act petition that requires -- it's an evidentiary motion that requires evidence, which they have not submitted. Not a cent of damages to support the $\$ 750,000$ claimed emotional distress they had from having their cell phones published.

Let me go back to the beginning,
though. I heard opposing counsel say that his clients, quote, "Welcome such debate." That's the end of this case, Your Honor, because if they welcome debate on the issues of public concern that are presented here regarding which their constituents were interested, then being able to contact those officials is definitionally of concern to the public. It's an element of their claim. They can't meet it. They have admitted quite the opposite.

I heard opposing counsel say that there were less invasive methods and they preferred to be contacted through the City website.

Your Honor, Mr. Law submitted a declaration here, uncontested, saying -- this is paragraph 16 of his declaration. "Efforts to communicate with the aldermen by phone, through the municipal office, or through their City e-mail addresses were met with little to no responses from the
aldermen."
Sure they wanted to be contacted through official channels. Easier to ignore the constituents who were trying to petition them that way. They just didn't respond.

As to the freedom to decide how they are contacted, we have cited this a couple of times, the Ostergren versus Cuccinelli case out of the Fourth Circuit. I'll just quote the holding from footnote eight. "The First Amendment protects the Defendant's freedom to decide how their message should be communicated." The government doesn't get to tell you how and when to contact them. It is not up to the Plaintiffs to say they only want to be contacted in this way. Their constituents get to decide how to petition them, not the other way around.

I also want to note, Your Honor, these are public officials and the
standards are different. So this is from the United States Supreme Court. In Gertz, they talk about -- and New York Times versus sullivan, they talk about how the fact -- how public officials are expected to tolerate both closer public scrutiny and vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.

These Plaintiffs simply are not equipped to be elected officials here, Your Honor, if they are suffering intense emotional distress by having their cell phone numbers publicized for the purposes of petitioning them. They are held to a higher standard. The reasonableness inquiry applies here. There is no conceivable way that they have met their burden of proof. And, in fact, they haven't even tried to because they think it's a Rule 12 motion when it's not. It's an evidentiary motion.

As to our reference to this case
as strange and unusual, opposing counsel is right, these are euphemisms. What I should have said is this is the most egregious SLAPP suit that we have ever seen in four years under the Tennessee Public

Participation Act, these elected
officials suing citizens for
contacting them about local policy,
local tax policy, policy regarding the upkeep of public parks. This is their job to be responsive to
constituents who have these concerns and bring them to their attention. They did so successfully here. And in response, they got sued.

As to whether it's not good enough to say that it's highly offensive, here's the problem, Your Honor. This is their burden of proof and they haven't found a single case anywhere in America that says you can sue somebody for publishing your cell phone number. Certainly they haven't found one that says elected officials
can do this. And as to whether or not this is or could be considered highly offensive, all you need to do is know that the Plaintiffs themselves, at least two of them, don't personally consider it to be highly offensive because they put it on the nominating petition that they circulated to their constituents, which are now on file with the election commission.

As to whether or not that's public, of course it's public. It is a public record definitionally under Tennessee law. That's how we got it. Ask for the nominating petition. Right there, cell phone number, first page.

Your Honor, I don't know what else to say other than that they haven't met their evidentiary burden on either element. As a matter of law, these claims fail completely and they have got nothing to respond to our valid defenses here. Every
single court that has adjudicated anything even resembling this issue has held that the First Amendment protects the right to publish contact information like this. That is a valid defense to liability.

Respectfully, there is only one correct ruling here and it is not a close call. Petition should be granted.

Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So there was one thing $I$ noticed in your brief. You said that they utilized White Pages. Can you elaborate on that? One of the two, I believe -- or one of the three numbers, I think there was a sentence in there that says that Mr. Law utilized White Pages, which is open to the public. So I am just interested to flesh that out.

MR. HORWITZ: Yes. Here's my understanding of that. I will note that, you know, my law firm uses similar software to locate people for
service of process or whatever.
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. HORWITZ: There is a White
Pages app, I think it's a
subscription service, that
aggregates --
THE COURT: This is for the record. The Court understands what White Pages are, but go ahead.

MR. HORWITZ: -- that aggregates public information, public contact information, and Mr. Law used that subscription service to generate the numbers that were then posted here for the purpose of petitioning elected officials about a proposed 50 percent tax increase.

THE COURT: Thank you.
This Court speaks through its orders, obviously, so I am going to take this matter under advisement and issue an opinion, but I will give you the next ten days to issue a proposed order, if you would like. I draft my own orders, but if you want to send

| 1 | me one, that's fine, but I will |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | certainly take this matter under |
| 3 | advisement. This is -- this is very |
| 4 | new ground under the law, so, like I |
| 5 | said, it's best that I flesh that out |
| 6 | in a written order because I'm sure |
| 7 | it's going to go up either direction |
| 8 | that I head. So I will do that as |
| 9 | soon as I can. Okay? |
| 10 | Any questions? |
| 11 | MR. HORWITZ: Thank you, Your |
| 12 | Honor. |
| 13 | MR. ELLIOTT: Thank you, Your |
| 14 | Honor. |
| 15 | THE COURT: Thank you. Very well |
| 16 | argued, very well briefed. |
| 17 |  |
| 18 | (Nothing further was heard and |
| 19 | these matters were concluded at |
| 20 | approximately 9:57 a.m.) |

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF TENNESSEE ) COUNTY OF LINCOLN )

I, Angela Butler, LCR\# 847, licensed court reporter and notary public, in and for the above hearing was reported by me and that the foregoing pages of the transcript are a true and accurate record to the best of my knowledge, skills, and ability.

I further certify that I am not related to nor an employee of counsel or any of the parties to the action, nor am I in any way financially interested in the outcome of this case.

I further certify that $I$ am duly licensed by the Tennessee Board of Court Reporting as a Licensed Court Reporter as evidenced by the LCR number and expiration date following my name below.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal this 16 th day of December, 2023.

> ANGELA BUTLER, RPR, LCR\# 916 Expiration date: $06 / 30 / 2024$ Notary Public Commission Expires: $05 / 26 / 2026$

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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{aligned} & \$ 750,000[2]-7: 15, \\ & 27: 21 \end{aligned}$ | ```a.m [2] - 3:10, 35:20 ability \({ }_{[1]}-36: 9\) able [1] - 28:9 absolutely \({ }_{[1]}-8: 17\) abundant \([3]\) - 5:12, 11:6, 14:12 access [1] - 10:13 accurate [1] - 36:8 Act \({ }_{[8]}-4: 5,4: 10\), 4:20, 6:5, 11:21, 16:14, 27:17, 31:7 action [1]-36:12 actual [1] - 9:21 additionally \({ }_{[1]}\) - 11:3 address [2]-8:7, 24:23 addresses [3] - 20:4, 22:8, 28:24 adjudicated [1] - 33:1 admissible [1] - 6:10 admit [1] - 26:22 admitted [3]-26:15, 26:17, 28:13 admittedly [1] - 14:10 advisement [2] - 34:21, 35:3 advocacy [3] - 7:6, 15:4, 15:17 advocates [2]-5:8, 7:1 affixed \({ }_{[1]}-36: 21\) affords [1]-15:20 aggregates [2] - 34:6, 34:10 ahead [1] - 34:9 Alabama \({ }_{[1]}\) - 11:11 alderman [1]-20:5 aldermen [5]-20:1, 22:2, 28:22, 29:1 Aldermen [1] - 22:12 allegation [2] - 20:14, 20:22 alleged [1] - 4:8 Allen [3] - 3:8, 3:13, 24:2 ALLEN \({ }_{[1]}-1: 5\) allow [1] - 9:24 allows [1] - 9:19 ambit [1] - 11:15 Amendment \([8]\) - 14:16, 14:25, 15:16, 15:20, 16:2, 16:8, 29:13, 33:3 America[1]-31:22``` | 36:23 <br> Angela [1] - 36: | best [2] - 35:5, 36:8 beyond ${ }_{[1]}-9: 1$ | channels [1] - 29:3 <br> CIRCUIT [2] - 1:1, |
| 0 |  | Anti [1]-16:14 anti-SLAPP ${ }_{[1]}$ | bit [1] - 4:12 <br> board [1] - 22 | Circuit [1] - 29:11 <br> circulated [1]-32:9 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 05/26/2026 }[1] \text { - } \\ & 36: 25 \\ & 06 / 30 / 2024[1]- \\ & 36: 24 \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 16:13 } \\ & \text { Anti-SLAPP }{ }_{[1]}- \\ & \text { 16:14 } \\ & \text { app }_{[1]}-34: 4 \end{aligned}$ | ```Board [2] - 22:12, 36:16 Box[1]-1:22 brief [5] - 17:23,``` | $\begin{gathered} \text { circumstances [2] - } \\ \text { 15:21, 16:16 } \\ \text { citation }[4]-7: 23 \text {, } \\ 12: 24,12: 25,23: 18 \end{gathered}$ |
|  |  | Appeals [1] - 17:20 <br> APPEARANCES ${ }_{[1]}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 18: 3,21: 7,23: 7 \\ & 33: 13 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { cited }[5]-21: 5,21: 8 \\ 21: 10,21: 12,29: 8 \end{gathered}$ |
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